To mark Africa Day 2024, ACTSA sought views on the situation in Zimbabwe, observing that while SADC has the mechanisms to address organised violence and torture, so far it has not used them to hold firm members’ shared standards for governing democratic elections.
Our guest author Tony Reeler, says ‘Zimbabwe is not “Peaceful”: SADC (and SEAC) need to act’. Tony Reeler is a Senior Researcher at the Research & Advocacy Unit (RAU)[1]
Was the 2023 election “peaceful” as most observers, including now the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission, have claimed, or was it just less violent than previous elections? It raises the question about whether elections in Zimbabwe are judged by a different standard to other Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries.
The SADC Extra-Ordinary Summit concluded its deliberations on the SADC Electoral Commission report on the 2023 Zimbabwe elections. Despite the terseness of the Summit Communique, the clear understanding is that SADC has accepted the report and its conclusions, and the big question before everyone is how they will respond. There were rumours that a preliminary step has been the constituting of a sub-committee to discuss the report and decide on the required action. The sub-committee was allegedly composed of Angola, Namibia, and Tanzania, and the exclusion of Zambia and Zimbabwe obvious given the continuous acrimony between these two countries after the release of the preliminary SADC Electoral Commission report.
Before any discussion about what SADC should do, a few points should be made in connection with the final report.
The first is that this report, and the reports of other observer missions, made reference to an apparent peaceful climate. The EU Observer Mission however, reported the following findings:
Despite appeals for peace by national and international actors, instances of violence, including battery, arson and kidnappings were noted by EU Observer Mission, especially in rural areas. Cases increased as election day neared. A CCC supporter was killed in a so-called opposition no-go area; 15 people were arrested and charged, pending trial. The intimidating presence of Forever Associates of Zimbabwe was observed by the EU Observer Mission at many rallies. Several observers received first-hand reports of coerced/incentivised attendance at Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front events. Cases of the latter’s supporters disturbing other parties’ rallies were observed in several areas (preliminary EU Observer Mission report).
The campaign environment was subdued but marked by tensions and instances of violence and intimidation, with undue limitations placed on the freedom of assembly, as well as a playing field that was tilted in favour of the incumbent and the ruling party. Most EU Observer Mission observers received reports of Forever Associates Zimbabwe actively intimidating voters throughout the campaign, especially in rural areas (final EU Observer Mission report).
Others stated “there was a reduction in the levels of political violence compared to previous elections” (AU-COMESA report) the reports imply there was violence nonetheless, which the SADC Electoral Commission report makes no mention of.
In places, the SADC Electoral Commission report makes contradictory statements. For instance, reporting on the SADC Election Advisory Council’s visit prior to the election, stated:
“The SEAC assessment mission concluded that the Republic of Zimbabwe was ready to hold Harmonised Elections in a calm and secure political environment. No major incidences of concern were brought to the attention of the Mission during this period. Significantly the Mission noted the stated commitment of the country’s leadership to avoid political violence, whilst acknowledging the apprehension of certain stakeholders regarding recent acts of intra-party political violence.” (Section 4.2 SADC Electoral Commission Report)….“The SADC Electoral Commission was informed that the rural vote may be compromised by alleged intimidation attributed to a group called Forever Associates Zimbabwe (FAZ), which is said to be a quasi-security intelligence organisation. The group was said to have been deployed to wards and around 36,000 villages. The allegations were that people were intimidated to vote in a particular manner and were warned that it would be easy to determine who had voted against certain parties.” (Section 7.10.1 SADC Electoral Commission Report)…“…at the beginning of its Mission, the existence of this group could not be verified as authorities that were requested to comment on the FAZ professed ignorance of its existence. However, the group was acknowledged after the elections.” (Section 7.10.2 SADC Electoral Commission Report)…“The SADC Electoral Commission commends the people of Zimbabwe for conducting themselves in a peaceful, orderly and exemplary manner during the pre-election phase, voting days and the immediate post-election period.”
Thus, the final Communique of the SADC Extra-Ordinary Summit in Luanda makes for confusing reading.
“Summit received an update on the elections in the SADC Member States and noted the report of the SADC Election Observation Mission to the Harmonised Elections in the Republic of Zimbabwe held in August 2023, and the General Elections in the Kingdom of Eswatini in September 2023.” (SADC Electoral Commission Report, Section 9).
So, in noting the report, what will SADC do with the report? Will it file it away for posterity or is there some consequent action to be taken? And if action is to be taken, what should that be? After all, the thrust of the report is that the 2023 elections failed the test of SADC best practice – the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections.
It is here that the issue about violence and conflict becomes relevant and the contradictory evidence produced by Zimbabwean human rights groups about the lack of “peace” should point SADC in the right direction, the deploying of SEAC to deal with post-election conflict. This is clearly specified in Section 2.10 of the SADC Electoral Advisory Council Strategy for the Prevention of Electoral Related Conflict: “Advise the Ministerial Committee of the Organ on the development of mediation strategies to address any post-election conflicts, as necessary.”
This must surely happen?
Why SEAC needs to act.
Firstly, the assumptions that the pre-election period was peaceful are not borne out by the available evidence, and even alluded to in several observer mission reports. As detailed in the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum report on the pre-election period, organised violence and torture were present throughout this period. This report, based on 1,463 violations reported to Zimbabwe human rights organisations, showed that over 60% of the reports, from January 2021 to July 2023, were of members of opposition political parties, and the monthly average of reported cases rose from 42 cases per month in 2023 to 58 in 2023. This hardly accords with SADC’s own definition of “peaceful” in its Principles and Guidelines, which states:
“Peaceful means electoral processes are punctuated by calm; are undisturbed and untroubled by violence or intimidation; are conflict-free and generally exude an atmosphere where all citizens are free and unhindered to express their right to vote; are able to offer themselves without intimidation for election, communicate freely their electoral choices; and enjoy freedom of assembly and association.” (SADC 2015).
This was the electoral climate into which SEAC conducted its pre-election mission in April 2023. Given Zimbabwe’s invidious history of violence in elections, some more careful investigation might have corrected SEAC’s bland assurance that the pre-election climate was peaceful.
Secondly, in relation to SEAC’s mandate and the possible action to be taken by SADC in accepting the SADC Electoral Commissions findings, relates to post-election conflict. Here the most recent report on organised violence and torture in Zimbabwe outlines the need for urgent action (source). It not only amplifies the findings of the previous report on the pre-election period, but extends the findings into the post-election period, and this is the relevance for SEAC and SADC. Narrowing its consideration of the pre-election to the 90 days prior the poll – the constitutional electoral period – it also examines the polling days, and then covers the period from 23 August to 7 October 2023.
The pre-election period, from 1 June to 22 August, merely compliments the findings of the preliminary report. There are multiple violations, mostly aimed at the members of the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), allegedly perpetrated by supporters of Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front – 66% of identified perpetrators – and involve very serious crimes. The fears about intimidation reported to SADC Electoral Commission and others are reported with great frequency: intimidation was reported in 33% of all cases pre-election and assaults were 28% of total violations.
The EU Electoral Commission excerted that the reports about the polling days were rather different to the claims by observers. Whilst the report corroborates the observation about the presence of Forever Associates Zimbabwe or Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front supporters at polling stations – in 38 (42%) reports – it also shows violations against polling agents (frequently violent) in 28 (32%) reports. Most polling agents were members of the CCC and were attacked or intimidated immediately after the closure of counting and even after polling was completed in some cases.
Since polling, however, organised violence and torture has been unabated. Whilst this has dropped from the 624 violations reported in the pre-election period, the fact that 347 violations have been reported post-election suggests that Zimbabwe remains in a state of conflict. Bear in mind that this report only covers the period up to 7 October 2023, and violations continue to be reported, with egregious attacks even on Members of Parliament.
What SADC should do
It is incontestable that Zimbabwe is in crisis, and, as predicted by some, the election will not solve the problems. It even may be that the SADC Electoral Commission’s report and SADC’s acceptance of the report will have effect of deepening the crisis. After all, the one serious implication in declaring that the elections have failed SADC’s own best practices, is that the legitimacy of the now-elected Zimbabwe government is contestable, and this will have serious implications for international re-engagement. Has Zimbabwe reached another “Lancaster House” moment?
The outcome of the 2023 elections produced some suggested solutions. A petition for international mediation was launched in the immediate aftermath of the election, signed by eighty thousand people on various platforms. The suggestion was made for the establishment of an Eminent Persons Group to lead discussions towards a political settlement, but the mechanism already exists for such action: it lies in the mandate of SEAC, clearly precipitated by the SEOM report and SADC’s endorsement of this. Zimbabwe is in conflict, and, as the Human Rights Forum report demonstrates, it is in violent conflict, let alone all the conflict over the procedural irregularities of the election. These latter are extensively documented in every international observer report, but combined with the evidence of violence, it will not be enough to merely suggest improvements to the electoral process in the future.
However, past history suggests that Zimbabwe is treated with kid gloves by SADC. The disclosure by Walter Mzembi, former minister in exile, about the manner in which Presidents Lourenco and Zuma were blocked from flying in to deal with the coup in 2017 do not indicate a willingness by SADC to be firm on violations of SADC treaties.
The future of Zimbabwe, the well-being of millions of its citizens, and even regional security are at stake, but eight months after the election there seems little urgency. All SADC has to do is to follow its own rules and start the process of mediation.
[1] Tony Reeler writes in his own capacity and is not representing the views of RAU or ACTSA.
ACTSA’s own report ‘Voices from the Frontline: shrinking space for Zimbabwe’s civil society organisations, September 2023’ is available to download from our website here.