As the problems in Zimbabwe deepen, ACTSA is working in solidarity with our Zimbabwean comrades to support them in the struggles that lie ahead.

Putting the Zimbabwean Crisis into Context

The Liberation Struggle

Zimbabwe's independence in 1980 was not only a victory for the Zimbabwean liberation movement, but a critical turning point for other struggles in the region. Up to 80 000 Zimbabweans died in the fight for freedom and independent Zimbabwe's continuing solidarity with the struggles in South Africa and Namibia cost it dear in more lives and economic hardship. This is in contrast to most of the Western nations who stood by or actively supported the apartheid regime, but are quick today to make pronouncements on defending democracy in the region. Their stance reflects underlying racist assumptions: when the white minority regime made its illegal Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 the British Government was prepared to endorse a settlement that would have put off black majority rule for generations. Now, when white farmers are dispossessed of their land, the West jumps to the defence of democracy.

The Lancaster House Agreement

In 1979 the newly elected Thatcher Government negotiated the Lancaster House Agreement in the face of rapid advances by the guerrilla fighters of the liberation movement. Essentially it was trying to broker a compromise under which the white minority would retain as much as possible of its political and economic privileges. The Agreement paved the way for democratic elections, but did little to help the new ZANU-PF Government redress the gross economic and social inequalities that resulted from white minority rule. Crucially it entrenched property rights for ten years and laid down that land could only be compulsorily acquired if it was under-utilised and if adequate compensation was paid. All other land exchanges had to take place on a willing seller, willing buyer basis.

In spite of this, Zimbabwe made significant strides in social provision and economic development in the period after independence. Between 1980 and 1990, real spending on health more than doubled, on primary education it nearly tripled, infant mortality fell from 88 to 61 per 1000 and literacy levels increased dramatically. These were great achievements for independent Zimbabwe.

Structural Adjustment and Economic Crisis

In 1990 the World Bank imposed a Structural Adjustment Programme on Zimbabwe which eroded its economic gains and led to a popular mobilisation against the government led by the trade unions. Despite the sweeping policy prescriptions urged by the IMF and World Bank, redistribution of land was not advocated; it is important to bear this in mind when assessing the British Government's current statements.

In response to growing protests, the Zimbabwean Government appeared to waver in its acceptance of the Structural Adjustment Programme, but it decided to continue and met opposition with growing restrictions. The government clampdown seemed to re-awaken civil society in a country where there had been limited organised criticism of ZANU-PF for much of the post-independence period, either inside or outside Parliament.

The Land Question

At the root of the current crisis is land. A history of land seizures by whites meant that by 1980 42% of the land, including the most fertile areas, was owned by 6000 white commercial farmers. Much of the white-owned land was left fallow or under-utilised, while most of the black population was crowded into low-quality Native Reserves (now Communal Areas). The drive to overturn this grotesque injustice was at the heart of the liberation struggle and central to the political objectives of all the liberation movements and to the debate about the final settlement at independence.

When the Thatcher Government insisted that the new Zimbabwe Government guaranteed existing property rights, so freezing the legacy of colonial injustice with regards to land, it was expected that the British Government would act promptly in helping to fund a resettlement programme under the terms agreed at Lancaster House. Zimbabwe was given broad assurances by both British and US officials that aid would soon be on its way. In the event, financial support for land resettlement projects was inadequate and slow in coming.

Michael Holman of the Financial Times noted recently: 'The total international assistance has fallen well short of the $2 billion once envisaged and donors refuse to put a figure to the amount that could be available. Mr Mugabe has let them off the hook by mismanaging the economy and allocating farms to henchmen and cronies, but the spirit, if not the letter, of the Lancaster House agreement has been broken.'

After the expiry of the ten-year period for the entrenchment of property rights agreed at Lancaster House, a cycle of increasing government rhetoric on speeding up land reform featured at politically significant points, especially elections. But in practice progress remained slow. Increasingly the government made land grants to politically favoured large-scale farmers.  In 1996 a Land Commission produced further proposals and in 1998 the Zimbabwean Government and international donors signed up to a programme of reform and the principles upon which it should be based. This produced a practical plan for a phased expansion of land reform, though fundamentally it still followed the same rules of the game established at Lancaster House.

In 1997 the first major moves by the Government to take over land occurred with proposals to acquire 1471 hectares. The Government's attempt to push through constitutional changes to allow appropriation of land were thwarted by the 'No' vote in the February 2000 referendum. The process then escalated with the official sanctioning of the farm occupations by the war veterans in the run-up to the June 2000 parliamentary elections and the Government's announcement of the implementation of a 'fast-track' land redistribution programme. Thousands of farmworkers were displaced from commercial farms.

The reality was that by 2005 there had been no significant reallocation of land to the people. Instead, through a process of cronyism, most farms went to the political elite. Most of the land taken over by the Government now lies unworked, producing only a fraction of what is needed to feed the country's people, let alone to trade with the outside world.

Escalating Repression

The Government's response to growing popular opposition has been two-pronged: increasing repression of the democracy movement and a dramatic escalation of anti-imperialist rhetoric aimed at re-evoking the aspirations of the liberation struggle.

One important early indicator of the depth of loss of popular support for the ZANU-PF Government, even in rural areas, was the rejection of the rushed and rigged 'consultation' on proposed constitutional changes to allow compulsory land acquisition and the rejection of constitutional proposals in the February 2000 referendum.

The ZANU-PF Government gave official free rein to war veterans to occupy farms in a desperate attempt to try and show the rural poor that after all the broken promises on land redistribution real action was now going to be taken. Perhaps more importantly, as white commercial farmers began to declare their support for the MDC, it made clear that political opposition to ZANU-PF would be blocked.

Since then there have been both parliamentary and presidential elections, all of them mired in accusations of vote rigging, violence and intimidation. Since the latest elections in March 2005, the Government and its security services have targeted people living in 'slums' and 'unofficial dwellings'. More than 200,000 people have been displaced by Operation Murambatsvina, and the number continues to rise. The Government has also moved more and more against the trade unions: attacks on union meetings, and particularly on women trade unionists, are increasing in both number and intensity. From January 2007, attacks on church and student leaders have been stepped up, and Mugabe is attempting to delay the next presidential election, due in 2008, until 2010.

Other areas of repression are:

• Curtailment of all press freedom with attacks on critical journalists, the expulsion or banning of foreign correspondents and heavy-handed manipulation of the public media;
• Undermining the independence of the judiciary with official sanction for ignoring court rulings (for example on farm occupations) and attempts to silence or dismiss judges and appoint replacements;
• Hurried legislation to ban foreign funding for political parties, while blocking opposition parties' access to the state funding that ZANU-PF enjoys, and the introduction of the NGO bill, designed to restrict funding of civic organisations;
• Ongoing action to silence independent voices in civil society, with rules preventing engagement in 'political' issues and attempts to place ZANU-PF supporters in NGOs;
• The increase in the use of surveillance and national intelligence agencies against critics both inside and outside the country.

ACTSA's Position

ACTSA:

Condemns the abuse of human rights and the ever-increasing oppression and lack of freedom in Zimbabwe, particularly the violence against women and workers.

Deplores the British Government's duplicity in, on the one hand, calling for 'regime change' and criticising human rights' abuses and, on the other, rejecting asylum applications from refugees and forcibly deporting people back to Zimbabwe.

Reminds people of the historical debts we still have to the Zimbabwean people because of the colonial land grab by British settlers and the insistence of the Thatcher Government on freezing this injustice at the time of the Lancaster House Agreement. 

Recognises the need to address the root causes of the ongoing political crisis - the economic inequalities and failed development strategies in which international agencies have played a significant role, including the imposition of discredited structural adjustment policies.

Highlights the role of Britain in the failure to achieve significant land reform in Zimbabwe through the flaws of the Lancaster House Agreement and its failure to provide adequate resources to support land programmes. It draws attention to the need for Britain to allocate significant funding for a major land reform programme resulting in the large-scale transfer of productive land with adequate infrastructure to small-scale black farmers, once democracy is restored to Zimbabwe and when conditions exist for this to take place in a just and orderly way.

Calls for recognition of the fact that economic development will be central to solving the crisis in the long-term and of the importance for Zimbabwe of wider ACTSA campaigns on issues like debt, HIV/AIDS and trade, which must be addressed by the international community if it is serious about rebuilding a just and democratic society in Zimbabwe. 

Draws attention to the wider implications of the Zimbabwe crisis and its lessons about the potential consequences of imposing economic conditionalities and interfering in governments' rights to formulate their own social and economic policies.